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Nationalism, as a political discourse requiring a fundamental connection to a particular territory has
constantly referred to maps as evidence of the eternal existence of the respective nation. In the case of
modern Turkey, the national map has been a symptomatic signifier of a constant anxiety of territorial
loss. Built around such anxiety, Turkish nationalism has been sensitive towards the borders defining
national territory. This article analyzes the use of national maps as instruments for the cultural
production of nationalism in Turkey throughout the last three decades. In the process, it is intended to
differentiate between official maps produced under state authority and popular maps circulated in mass
media.
Throughout the 1980s, national maps included in school textbooks presented a country surrounded by
hostile neighbors on all sides, in tune with the political climate of the Cold War. A crucial aspect of these
official maps was the cartographic awareness they generated which, in the following decade, would
become operational in the widespread use of the map as a nationalist sign. With the emergence of the
Kurdish question in the 1990s, the national map became a key instrument in promoting nationalist
sentiments with the invention of the flag-map logo as a favorite symbol. After the US-led invasion of Iraq
in 2003, the Kurdish issue was projected on to Northern Iraq, and a new mode of cartographic repre-
sentation was invented. “Appropriated maps” produced through the digital retouching of random maps
found on the Internet visualized irredentist desires enlarging the country’s territory especially into
Northern Iraq and invoking the Ottoman past. These maps, which consciously distorted geographical
information, turned to historical references to sustain their cartographic validity.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.On August 7th 2006, the Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet
reprinted a map that was originally produced by the retired US
military officer Ralph Peters and which had been published in the
June 2006 issue of the Armed Forces Journal. The map, which
depicted an imaginary Middle East as a solution to the political
conflicts in the region, was originally coupled with another map
showing the current situation in the Middle East. Entitled “Before”
and “After”, the two maps represented the existing borders and
national territories with different colors (Fig. 1). The “After” map
illustrated the arguments of the article redesigning the existing
national territories and introducing new countries (Peters, 2006).
For the Turkish media, the infuriating aspect of the map was not
only the fact that Turkey was depicted as losing a significant
amount of land in its eastern part, but that this land constituted
a major portion of a “Free Kurdistan” together with land from Syria,
Iran and Iraq. Cumhuriyet published the map in color on its first
page with the headline “The Plan of Disintegration,” attributing the
map to the US Armed Forces. In addition, the newspaper published.
All rights reserved.both of themaps in larger format in a half-page article on its foreign
news page (Cumhuriyet, August 7th 2006: 11). As Tur-
kisheAmerican relations were going through a severe crisis with
Turkey’s refusal to aid the US military in the occupation of Iraq in
2003, the map quickly became a symbol of a US conspiracy against
Turkish national unity and triggered widespread protests.
Although the reaction of the Turkish public to this map e to
which I will return below e is not surprising considering the
ongoing armed struggle between the Kurdish separatists based in
Northern Iraq and the Turkish state, it is significant that a fixation
with national borders has been a constant element of Turkish
political culture since the establishment of the republic in 1923.
This was owing to the experience of the Ottoman Empire with
ethnic revolts throughout the nineteenth century, the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877e1878, and the Balkan Wars of 1912e1913,
which all together represented a continuous process of territorial
decline that eventually ended up with total collapse at the end of
WorldWar I. The capital city of Istanbul as well as most of what was
left in the Anatolian peninsula were occupied by the allied forces
according to the Sevres Treaty of 1920. Following the Turkish
Independence War fought against the Greeks in 1919e1922, the
borders of the newly established republic were agreed upon in the
Fig. 1. The Middle East “Before” and “After” (Peters, 2006).
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Turkish nationalism has been a constant fear of an imperialist
conspiracy aimed at disintegrating the nation, the major symbol of
which was the Sevres Treaty. The building of a Turkish nation-state
from the remnants of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire was
pursued with particular hostility towards minorities. The nation-
alist elite that led the nation-building process in republican Turkey
tended to suppress the ethnic differences within the country. As
ideological support for this policy, the state bureaucracy was
propelled by “the Sevres Syndrome”, an irrational fear that the
Western powers were constantly looking to dismantle Turkey in
accordance with the Sevres Treaty (Guida, 2003; Robins, 2003:
161e180).
In this article, I intend to analyze the use of national maps as an
instrument in the cultural production of nationalism in Turkey
since the 1990s. This period is significant as it witnessed both the
end of the Cold War and the escalation of the armed struggle for
Kurdish independence, two major events that amplified the influ-
ence of nationalism as a political discourse in Turkey. Throughout
this period, the use of the national map transformed not only the
meanings the map embodied but also the agents of its production.
My aim is to show that although the nation-state is a powerful
agent in producing official maps and dominating the cartographic
representations of the nation, other social actors are also capable of
producing maps to disseminate their political views, especially
with the help of digital technology and the availability of the
Internet.
Here, I have three major intentions. The first concerns the
relationship between official cartography and popular cartography.
I argue that the popular perception of maps is also an effect of
official maps; that is, the official maps not only transmit messages
through cartographic representations, but they also produce a level
of awareness regarding maps. As I discuss below, the emphasis put
on national maps in primary and high school textbooks in the 1980s
produced such an effect in Turkey and this was influential in the
later widespread use of the national map. My second intention is to
show that themasses are notmerely the recipients of official and/or
popular maps presented to them by the authorities. The production
of maps in the form of cultural artifacts opened up possibilities for
new meanings being attached to the maps, which stem from their
use rather than from the intentions of their producers. A good
example of this is the wide-scale and wide-ranging use of the
Turkish map in the form of a logo in the 1990s. As the map is
detached from the field of official cartography and reproduced as an
image within popular culture, it becomes open to a new icono-
graphic field through the new signs and symbols attached to it.
Finally, I intend to expand the definition of “popular cartography”,
taking into consideration the maps produced by ordinary people.
The availability of digital technologies and the Internet has allowed
the average person to easily produce “appropriated maps” (by
retouching existing ones) and circulate them, as illustrated by the
ones produced by the Turkish ultra-nationalist Internet users in
response to Peters’ Middle East map. This type of cartographic
production significantly broadens the definition of popular
cartography since it transforms the practice of mapmaking,
rendering any cartographic skill unnecessary.
Throughout the article I discuss examples of national maps
produced in three periods. I use the maps included in the school
textbooks in the 1980s as both examples of the cartographic
representation of Turkey during the Cold War and as the origin of
a cartographic awareness regarding the national map as a nation-
alist symbol. This aspect of the textbook maps is crucial since it
illustrates the link between official mapping and popular (percep-
tion of) cartography. The wide-scale use of the map-logo in the
1990s builds on this foundation and allows the everyday use of themap in this new cultural form. In this period, the national map
became a major instrument in reproducing nationalist sentiments
in the face of the Kurdish question in Turkey. The favorite use of the
map in popular culture was the flag-map logo superimposing
the crescent-and-star of the Turkish flag onto the outline of the
national territory. As I will show, this particular image itself
unconsciously reproduced the very difference it served to suppress
between the western and the eastern parts of the country, and the
Kurdish identity of the latter. Finally, the publicity of the Peters map
in Turkish newspapers triggered a wave of ultra-nationalist maps
circulating on the Internet, which form the third set of maps that I
study. These maps, which I call “appropriated maps”, were
produced by the reworking of existing maps through using various
forms of software and visualized the irredentist desires of Turkish
nationalists to enlarge the country’s territory especially into
Northern Iraq and invoking the Ottoman past.
It has to be underlined that each set of maps referred to in
relation to these three periods has a different iconographic status.
While the maps in the textbooks of the 1980s are official maps with
a cartographic claim to scientific accuracy, the logo-maps of the
1990s are images detached from the field of official cartography and
reproduced endlessly in various forms and media. The digitally
produced and electronically circulated maps of the last epoch, on
the other hand, have a totally different cartographic claim. This
time the emphasis is not on the “truth” of the geographical situa-
tion but the desire to represent territorial claims backed by
reconstructed historical evidence. I have used examples from
a large number of maps that exist for each period and analyzed
these examples with specific regard to the political iconography
they embody.
The map as a political tool
Following the pioneering work of Harley (1988, 1989, 1990),
various scholars have analyzed the relationship between power
and cartographic representation. Referring to the work of Foucault,
Harley has argued that the production of cartographic knowledge
cannot be thought as independent from socio-political power
relations. With an intrinsic claim to scientific accuracy, the map
convinces the observer that what s/he sees is an objective repre-
sentation of the geographical situation. In reality, what the map
presents is a representation of the real situation, and as with every
representation, the gap between the real and its representation is
filled with power relations consumed within socially constructed
meanings (Monmonier, 1996; Wood, 1992). That is, even the most
“accurate” map inevitably gets caught up within power relations
with what it shows as well as what it fails to show. Hence, the maps
are discursive tools socially produced to persuade others (Pickles,
1992: 194).
The power of the map as a representational tool has been
utilized towards maintaining political power and constructing
identities. Claim to a particular land, whether it is in the form of
a state’s claim to a territory or a social group’s attachment to its
habitat, goes hand in hand with the production of representations
supporting it (Peckham, 2000). State-produced maps have always
been a particularly important instrument in maintaining authority
on space and its inhabitants (Edney, 1997; Hu, 2007; Monmonier,
1996). Especially with the rise of nation-states, the map has
emerged as a powerful sign of national unity and a cultural product
materializing nationalist discourse. Nations as “imagined commu-
nities” have constantly referred to the shape of their territory as
proof of their existence (Anderson, 1991: 170e178). Moreover,
within the nationalist discourse, the homeland is always a historic
land, which would serve as support for the historic memories and
associations bringing people together and confirming the eternal
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an essential task of nationalist discourses to maintain the link
between nation and territory.
In this regard, maps have emerged as skillful tools for visually
associating the nation with its homeland within the popular
imaginary in the twentieth century (Anderson,1991: 174e175). The
presentation of the national territory in the form of maps within
textbooks and atlases serves for the rationalization and naturali-
zation of the relationship between the territory and the people
provoking a sense of “territorial bonding” (Herb, 2004). In addition,
it legitimizes the relationship between the state and territory
emphasizing authority and possession. Nevertheless, the produc-
tion of maps is not exclusive to the state, and the maps also act as
products of popular culture, serving as a means of representing
space (Culcasi, 2006; Kosonen, 1999). While “official mapping”
dominated by state authority has been widely discussed, “popular
cartography”, that is, the maps designed for the masses and
circulating in themassmedia has remained less explored (Kosonen,
2008: 22).
The maps in school textbooks provide further interesting
dimensions regarding the politics of cartographic representations.
As Herb (2004) has argued, they are consumed at a crucial stage in
the development of sociospatial knowledge. Because of this,
cartographic representations in school textbooks have been widely
utilized to support nationalist claims in different national contexts
(Paasi, 1996: 145e151). Moreover, they exist at the intersection
between official and popular cartography; although they reflect
popular conceptions, they are produced by intellectual elites and
their content is regulated by government agencies (Herb, 2004:
143). In this respect, national maps in school textbooks are a means
for official cartography to influence popular cartography. Yet, the
maps also have ideological consequences that surface in the longer
run, in addition to their immediate effects (Helgerson, 1992:
107e147). As I will discuss in detail below, while these maps serve
for the generation of a sense of attachment to the depicted territory,
they also create a cartographic awareness. What is meant by
cartographic awareness here is not consciousness regarding the
iconography of maps or attentiveness towards the ideological
meanings embedded in maps. It is rather familiarity with the map
as a visual object. In the longer run, cartographic awareness leads to
the perception of the map as an everyday image in the cultural
sphere.
The widespread use of national maps as a cultural signifier of
nationalism has to be understood in relation to banal nationalism
(Billig, 1995). According to Billig, banal nationalism works through
the unnoticed signifiers embeddedwithin everyday life. His famous
example is the “forgotten reminding” of the “national flag, hanging
outside a public building or decorating a filling-station forecourt” in
contrast to the “passionately waved flags” (Billig, 1995: 38). As I
discuss below, the extensive circulation of the national map in
Turkey functions similarly and disseminates banal nationalism.
Mapping Turkey within the Cold War
The trauma of the rapid territorial decline that marked the fall of
the Ottoman Empire, and especially the experience of the First
World War in which the Ottoman Empire allied with Germany and
the Central Powers, continued to haunt the Turkish political
imagination even after the founding of the Republic. Built around
a sense of external threat (especially from the European powers)
the constitutive discourse of Turkish nationalism based itself on
exclusion and otherness (Bali, 2006; Özcan, 2006: 63e83). Within
this discourse, especially the Greeks and the Arabs were conceived
as hostile neighbors. The former were blamed for the military
campaign they launched to invade Western Anatolia, and the latterfor “betraying” the Ottoman Empire (the Caliphate) and collabo-
rating with the British “infidels” during the World War. Yet the
Kurds were the ones to most suffer such hostility, since they were
the largest minority that was denied a nation-state under the post-
WWI status-quo. Kurdish territory, which was once a part of the
Ottoman Empire, was partitioned into Turkey, Iraq (under British
mandate) and Syria (under French mandate). As their claims for
autonomy were disregarded during the WWI peace conferences,
the Kurds revolted in the name of self-determination in the
following decades. Between 1920 and 1938, the young Turkish
State had to confront seventeen Kurdish rebellions, three of which
(those in 1925, 1928 and 1938) were major (Özcan, 2006: 54e72).
As a response to the recurring rebellions, the Turkish state deployed
various assimilation strategies ranging from forced migration to
military operations. Martial law, declared in the region in 1925, was
not lifted until after WWII, and foreigners were not allowed to
travel in the region until 1965 (Başkaya,1991: 53). Nevertheless, the
guerilla war launched by the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) in
1984 proved to be the most troublesome one the Turkish republic
has ever faced. The armed conflict between Kurdish separatists and
government forces escalated especially after the First Gulf War in
1991 which created a power vacuum in Northern Iraq. Here, before
analyzing the nationalist responses to the intensifying Kurdish
question in the 1990s, I shall turn to the 1980s and discuss the
utilization of nationalism as an antidote to the “communist threat”
within the context of the Cold War.
During the Cold War, the hostility lying at the heart of Turkish
nationalism towards Turkey’s neighbors became geopolitically
functional towards the Russians who were the eternal enemies of
the Ottomans (the close solidarity between the republicans and the
Soviet Union in the 1920s was quickly suppressed within official
history) as well as the Bulgarians. Needless to say, the pro-Soviet
Arab states of Syria and Iraq were also seen as threats. In addition to
these, the ongoing dispute with Greece regarding the Aegean
islands was escalated to the verge of armed conflict with Turkey’s
occupation of Northern Cyprus in 1974. Finally, with the Islamic
Revolution in Iran in 1979, Turkeywas under full siege by the 1980s.
In the face of this constant threat, the Turkish nation had to be
unified and stay in a state of alarm at all times. Especially after the
military coup in 1980, which ruthlessly suppressed popular
movements and implemented a new economic and political
regime, a particularly xenophobic nationalism found its way into
the educational system. The coup was one of many military inter-
ventions backed by the US against the “communist threat”
throughout the Third World. The military regime saw the remold-
ing of the educational system with a nationalist thread as a major
component of the struggle against communism. In this context,
school textbooks became a significant means of ideological indoc-
trination (Gürleyen, 1998).
The geopolitical imagination of Turkish nationalism, similar to
other examples in various national contexts, reproduced itself
through maps, particularly ones that were reproduced in school
textbooks in the 1980s. Each and every classroom in elementary
and high schools was required to have a national map hung on its
walls. In addition, a decree regulating the formal qualities of text-
books also required the textbooks to include national maps
(Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, 1985: 9e13). Accordingly,
all textbooks regardless of their subjects were required to include
a portrait of Kemal Atatürk and the words of the national anthem in
their first pages and a national map in their last page. Fig. 2 shows
an example of such maps included in a high school textbook for
Turkish Language and Literature (Birkan, 1988). In these maps, the
rectangular form of the countryewith a ratio of roughly 1:2.5e fits
into the 16  24 cm standard textbook page with landscape layout
on a scale of 1:10 million. The maps are always framed with bold
Fig. 2. “The Map of Turkey” (Birkan, 1988).
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frame. Such framing implies the objectivity of the map; the rect-
angular plane is cut out of the globe as witnessed by the latitudes
and longitudes. In other words, the frame transforms the
geographic place into an object of knowledge definedwith a certain
set of codes. The map in Fig. 2 shows the provinces of Turkey
together with the cities that are provincial capitals. Other than
these, the only information presented is the names of the seas
surrounding the country. It is interesting to note that the shore lines
and the continental borders are shown with the same line type.
Neither the borders separating neighboring countries from each
other nor the names of these countries exist in the map. Although
there is minimal information regarding the exterior of the country,
the provincial borders within the country are given with dashed
(permeable) lines. The visual information on the provincial orga-
nization of the country suggests the existence of the nation-state
within themap; the national territory is conceived within the order
imposed on it by the state.
Yet these are not all there is to the map. The frame of the map is
carefully drawn to include certain areas. Significantly, the Aegean
islands, which belong to Greece, are shown in the map while
mainland Greece is cut out. Depicted this way, the islands appear as
located within the territorial waters of Turkey. In addition, the
southern border of the map cuts the island of Cyprus into two,
including the northern part under Turkish occupation and omitting
the southern part. The desire to incorporate Cyprus into the
national map and the reluctance to include the whole island, which
is actually a sovereign state, resulted in the functioning of the map
frame as an actual border marking Turkey’s political claims
regarding the island. Hence, the map frame does not only “objec-
tively” carve out the country and its close surroundings, but also
includes and omits certain features which gives an impression that
the physical proximity of the territories included within the map is
proof of Turkey’s right to these territories.
In other versions, even if the maps provide more details, they
deploy the same representational strategy. In some examples the
seas are cross-hatched and the rivers are shown outreaching thenational borders. In addition, some of the provinces are also shaded
dark randomly in order to create a visual pattern. In spite of such
details, the neighboring countries are never identified. When
hatching is used, it also functions as an instrument of visualizing
political disputes. The hatching of the seas brings the Aegean
islands to the foreground making them extensions of mainland
Turkey. Interestingly, in these examples northern Cyprus is also
shaded, as if it is another province of Turkey.
The national maps, included in all textbooks published between
1985 and 1991, illustrate the dominant mode of cartographical
representation of Turkey within primary and high-school educa-
tion prior to the end of the Cold War. By means of these maps,
pupils were required to identify with the national territory, repre-
sented not as a globally identifiable geographical location but as
their own country. The lack of information regarding the exterior of
the national borders was not merely an indifference towards other
countries. The blank territories beyond national borders repre-
sented a constant unidentified threat, to which young pupils (as
well as the whole nation) should always be attentive. The national
territory itself was represented within a spatial order imposed by
the state, visually reproduced by the provincial organization of the
country. The students could recognize the province they lived in;
a part of the whole which made the body of the country. Moreover,
political disputes played a significant role within these maps,
although they were presented quite subtly. The maps emphasized
the physical proximity of the Aegean islands to mainland Turkey,
and Cyprus was cut into two either by a border or at times by the
map frame itself, perceptually attaching the northern half of the
island to mainland Turkey.
Here, what is important for our discussion is the effect of the
maps in school textbooks regarding the emergence of a certain
level of cartographic awareness. The primary function of these
maps was the visual production of a sense of nationhood among
pupils. Yet, they also create familiarity with the map as a visual
object. The cartographic awareness generated by the students’
continuous exposure to the national map in the classroom space
allows the students to perceive of the national map as a mundane
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cartography. This, in turn, opens the possibility of the national map
to be incorporated into the cultural repertoire of everyday life. This
effect of the national maps in school textbooks is vital to the later
emergence of the logo-map which I will discuss below. However,
before going into the analysis of the map-as-logo, I shall discuss the
transformation of official nationalism represented by the national
maps in school textbooks after the end of the Cold War.
Outward nationalism: discovery of Turks beyond borders
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Turkic
states in Central Asia triggered a drastic shift in Turkey’s foreign
policy in the early 1990s. Turkey became the first state to recognize
these new states formally and their presidentswere invited toTurkey
for a Turkic Summit in 1992 (Çelebi, 2006: 66). Trade relations were
quickly established and funds allocated for investment in these
countries. Such a move towards establishing close ties with these
newly-born nations rested on an optimistic idea that Turkey could
become the leader of the “Turkic world”, and act as a model with its
government system and market economy. Although this attempt to
become the “big brother”of Turkic stateswould eventually failwithin
less than a decade, Turkish nationalists’ hopes for the creation of
a Turkic union under the leadership of Turkey found echo in the
Turkish public as well (Uslu, 2003). This new foreign policy wasFig. 3. “The Map of the Turkic Worldcoupledwith an ideological campaignpropagating the cultural ties of
Turkey with Central Asia. A significant component of this campaign
was the inclusion of maps of the “Turkic World” in school textbooks
with adecree in1993 (Ministryof Education,1993a: 9). Togetherwith
the national maps, the textbooks were required to include a map
showing the Turkic states as well as the geographical distribution of
Turkic populations across Eurasia (Fig. 3).
In contrast to the national maps produced via a cylindrical
projection (emphasizing the rectangular shape of the country), the
“Turkic World”map incorporated into the textbooks was produced
with a conical projection which centered on the Turkic states in
Central Asia, more specifically Kazakhstan. The use of this conic
projection presents Central Asia as the focus of the “Turkic World”.
In addition, it serves to minimize Europe, most of which is already
left outside the map. The map also excludes South and East Asia,
areas which would appear larger due to the use of the conic
projection. Significantly, most of China is also hidden from the view
with the legend located at the bottom right corner of the map. As
the Turkic states of Central Asia lay at the center of the map, the
Turkic populated territories compose a wide belt stretching from
Siberia to Anatolia. The Turkic population scattered across the globe
is shown in three different categories: independent states, auton-
omous territories and areas populated by Turks within other
nation-states. Within the last category, even the guest workers in
Europe are recorded. Depicted as such, the Turkic population‘ (Ministry of Education, 1993b).
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only are distinct peoples living in various countries represented as
a united body, but they also appear as the most populous body of
people since China and India are virtually excluded from the map.
Interestingly, in addition to the emergence of the map of the
Turkic world, the national maps included in the textbooks also
went through a significant transformation in the 1990s (Fig. 4). The
neighboring countries began to be identified with both their names
as well as the borders separating them from each other. In the new
maps, there is a visible effort to include Azerbaijan. Similar to the
inclusion of the Aegean islands on the western part of the map, the
map frame is used to contain at least a small portion of Azerbaijan.
While the exclusion of mainland Greece accentuated the proximity
of the islands to Turkey, the inclusion of even the name of
Azerbaijan implies the closeness of the country to Turkey,
geographically as well as politically.
Significantly, parallel to the inclusion of neighboring countries,
the lines representing the latitudes and longitudes disappear.
Previously, these cartographic codes were the only means locating
the nation globally; now, the location is identifiable in the country’s
relationship with its neighbors. That is, while the latitudes and
longitudes had worked as signs of global positioning within
a hostile region of the globe, the inclusion of the names of the
neighboring countries maintain connections and eradicate
hostility, which in turn renders the cartographic codes irrelevant.
The maps included in school textbooks are products of official
mapping; that is, they are cartographic representations controlled
and disseminated by the state. In this regard, the relative liber-
alization of the textbook maps and the diminishing of the hostility
they embody towards other nations in the first half of the 1990s
illustrate the optimism of official nationalism resting on a neo-pan-
Turkist perspective. However, as was mentioned earlier, the early
1990s also witnessed the rise of Kurdish separatism of the PKK
which resulted in the rapid fading of such optimism and the rise ofFig. 4. “The Map of Tura racist-ethnicist nationalism advocating a military solution e
repression by force e to the Kurdish question (Bora, 2003:
436e437). Although the armed insurrection in Kurdish provinces
had begun in 1984, it was fairly confined until the Gulf War in 1991.
After the war, the power vacuum that emerged in Northern Iraq
allowed the PKK to grow stronger. With a daily death toll of 8e10
soldiers, the Turkish government implemented new measures in
the region and the Turkish military launched a wide-scale
campaign that eventually extended into Northern Iraq. Between
1993 and 1995, wide-scale military operations were executed
across the border. During this period, both human rights violations
and anti-Kurdish nationalism intensified in Turkey. Mainstream
media fueled the escalation of nationalism via dramatic reports on
combat news and soldiers’ funerals. A significant visual symbol of
rising nationalism in popular media in this period was again the
national map, only this time reproduced in the form of logo.
Territory as national symbol: map-as-logo
A favorite use of the map as a nationalist sign has been its
production as a logo, isolated from its surrounding geographical
context and implying a unity within its boundaries (Agnew, 1998;
Edsall, 2007; Francaviglia, 1995). Such a representation visualizes
almost all common aspects of nationalist ideologies; a clear-cut
distinction between the interior (the nation) and the exterior (the
others), and a homogeneous population of individuals sharing
a harmonious way of life within the represented territory. The
national map-as-logo, in this sense, easily turns into a cultural
symbol of national identity (Edsall, 2007: 337). Anderson traces the
origin of the map-as-logo to the practice of the imperial states of
coloring their colonies onmaps (Anderson,1991: 175). This practice
turned each of the colonies into a piece of a jigsaw puzzle
detachable from its geographic context. This imagery allowed the
map to transform into a pure sign that could easily be recognizedkey” (Erinç, 2001).
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later consumed by the emergent anticolonial nationalisms
(Anderson, 1991: 175).
Within the Turkish context, the emergence of the national map
as a logo occurred only in the 1990s, in the face of the intensifying
Kurdish question. The most common use of the logo-map was the
superimposition of its silhouette with the national flag. Colored
red and containing a crescent and a star in the center, this flag-
map logo quickly penetrated into popular imagination. For
instance, two mainstream newspapers, Sabah and Akşam changed
their logos into the map logo in 1993 and 1997, respectively. The
use of the silhouette minimizes the map into the solidness and
impenetrability of the outline and implies the homogeneity of its
interior. Clearly, the monolithic fill emphasizes the distinction
between the interior and the exterior and suppresses internal
differences, suggesting uniformity and national pride (Edsall,
2007: 343).
The pervasiveness of the map-logo in various forms ranging
from organizational logos and political posters to stickers and key
chains can be understood in terms of banal nationalism. As Billig
has argued, banal nationalism works with subtle reminders of
nationhood, which are hardly noticed within everyday practices
(Billig, 1995: 8). In this sense, the map-logo provides a good
example of banal nationalism. It is reproduced in countless cultural
forms within social life and it reminds the citizens of their place as
national subjects. In cases embodying ethnic conflicts banal
nationalism functions as a subtle way to assert hostility against
minorities. In the case of Turkey, the map-logo serves as a familiar
and continual sign to refute Kurdish identity.
Although the map-logo is an instrument of representing the
nation as a unified body, the political iconography of the maps is
not limited to the messages they serve to convey in accordance
with the ideological preferences of their producers. There are also
elements the map speaks of involuntarily, which could be defined
as the “unconscious of the map”. The Turkish map-logo provides an
example for this idea. While the most important aspect of the map-
logo is its depiction of the nation as a solid entity, the use of the
crescent-and-star in the center of the map actually disturbs
the homogeneity of the interior. It unconsciously differentiates the
western and the eastern parts and highlights the very difference
the logo tries to repress: the Kurdish identity of the eastern prov-
inces. This unconscious attentiveness towards the directionality of
the flag-map becomes particularly apparent when a third element
is added to the map.
An interesting example illustrating the case is the cover page of an
exhibition album published by the General Chief of Staff in 2007. The
album assembled the exhibition photographs honoring the 125th
anniversaryofKemalAtatürk’s birth. The cover containedaportrait of
Atatürk, a well-known dictum of his in his handwriting (Ne Mutlu
Türküm Diyene! [How fortunate he who calls himself a Turk!]), the
crescent-and-star of the Turkish flag in the background, and finally
the flag-map as the central element of the composition (Fig. 5).
Although the inclusion of Cyprus and the coloring of its northern part
as an extension of Turkey attract attention, the striking component
here is the seal of the General Chief of Staff on the map. The seal is
imprinted to the left of the crescent, that is, on thewesternpart of the
country. The emptiness of the eastern part in contrast to the seal
clarifies the geopolitical position of the Armed Forces. In contrast to
the eastern part of the country, which was literally the battlefield in
which it has been conducting operations for the last two decades, the
Turkish army felt at homeonly in thewest.Hence, themap-logo turns
into the signifier of the verydifference it serves to repress; although it
is deployed to represent the nation as a homogeneous unity, it points
to the difference between the eastern and western parts of the
country.The second example is a campaign ad designed for the 2009
local elections. The ad, which was circulated in _Iskenderun in
December 2008, endorsed the existing mayor for a second term in
office. While the flag-map is again the central element in the ad,
themayor himself is seen on the upper left corner, rising behind the
map and pointing his finger with a threatening gesture (Fig. 6). The
line above themap reads “this country is ours”, while bold letters in
white across the map reads “love it or leave it!” The message
appears as the mayor’s own words, which is in tune with his
intimidating gesture. The globally famous motto written across the
map, which was originally invented in the US against those
demonstrating against the Vietnam War, leaves the receiver of the
message with two choices: to be assimilated or to be expelled.
Significantly, this ultra-nationalist motto (which has become
popular in Turkey in the mid-1990s) is divided into two phrases as
it is located on themap.While the phrase on thewestern part of the
map reads “love”, the eastern part commands “leave!” It is hard to
miss the geographical positioning of these textual messages on the
map.
As illustrated with these two examples, the map-logo which
emerged in the 1990s simultaneously emphasized a unified nation
represented with solid borders and a nation inherently divided into
western and eastern parts. The contradictory characteristic of the
map-logo that was widely reproduced within popular culture has
to be understood as a symptom of the dilemma of the general
approach to the Kurdish question. On the one hand all political
actors as well as the Turkish public desired a solution to the
problem and an end to armed conflict. Yet, on the other hand, the
dominant nationalist thread did not allow for a peaceful solution
that required recognition of Kurdish identity.
Mapping the Kurdish question across borders
TheMiddle East map produced by Ralph Peters, discussed in the
beginning of this article, became the cartographic signifier of a new
phase of Turkish nationalism coping with the Kurdish question.
Before, the issue was conceived within national borders; even
though the PKK had bases in Northern Iraq, the power vacuum in
the area allowed the Turkish military to freely conduct operations.
That is, in terms of security, the territory was still seen as “interior”.
However, after 2003, the rapidly increasing influence of the Kurdish
regional government among Kurds across the Middle East in
general, prompted a new wave of anti-Kurdish nationalism in
Turkish political discourse (Grigoriadis, 2006; Somer, 2004). Here,
it has to be mentioned that the shift in the public perception of
the Kurdish question in Turkey does not necessarily coincide with
the actual developments regarding Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. The
Kurdistan autonomous region was recognized as early as 1970. Yet,
in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, the area became de facto inde-
pendent. Finally, the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003 and the
implementation of the new Iraqi constitution in 2005 resulted in
the emergence of Iraqi Kurdistan as a federal entity recognized by
Iraq and the United Nations.
For the part of the Turkish public, however, the period in which
the Iraqi Kurds enjoyed de facto independence throughout the
1990s was marked by the military incursions of the Turkish army
into Northern Iraq. In other words, the area was perceived as an
extension of the Kurdish region of Turkey, in which the army freely
conducted operations. The Turkish troops’ penetration into Iraq in
pursuit of PKK fighters throughout the mid-1990s resulted in the
call of the PKK for a ceasefire in 1998. A year later, Abdullah Öcalan,
the leader of the PKK, was apprehended. With these developments,
the threat posed by the PKK to the Turkish state considerably
diminished only to re-escalate after the fall of the Saddam regime
in 2003. The Turkish Parliament’s decision denying access to the US
Fig. 5. The cover of Turkish Republic: Past and Present by the General Chief of Staff.
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military operations in Northern Iraq. This, in turn, created suitable
grounds for the PKK to consolidate its power in the region. The
organization lifted the ceasefire in 2004 and gradually escalated its
operations with bombings in Turkish cities.
Within this context, the Turkish public realized for the first time
the existence of a Kurdish political entity, which was now beyond
the reach of the Turkish army. Moreover, Iraqi Kurdistan was now
a focus of attraction for the Kurds in eastern Turkey with its rapidly
increasing living standards. Hence, the threat from the Kurdish
identity, which had been perceived as a domestic issue, was pro-
jected onto Northern Iraq, which now became impervious to
Turkish military operations. The possibility of irredentist claims to
the Kurdish region of Turkey from the Kurds in Northern Iraq aswell as the escalating activities of the PKK across the border
transformed the political imagination of the problem which, as we
have seen, has frequently been constructed through maps.
In this regard, the Peters map triggered a traumatic confronta-
tion on the part of the Turkish public. Since the military operations
in mid-1990s resulted in the perception of Northern Iraq as an
extension of eastern Anatolia, the Peters map reversed the identity
of this unified (Kurdish) region. Now, it was gradually going under
the cultural influence of the Kurdish regional government rather
than the military control of the Turkish state. It was as if the map
visualized concrete territorial claims raised by the Iraqi Kurds to
annex eastern Turkey.
When Cumhuriyet brought the map to the public agenda and
turned it into a major issue provoking anti-American sentiments,
Fig. 6. “Love it or Leave it!” Radikal, December 3rd 2008.
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Thought Association, a major civil organization promoting Kemalist
ideology launched a signature campaign against the Peters map
(Hürriyet, October 16th 2006). In July 2007, a fewweeks prior to the
early general elections, Hürriyet published news of an incident that
occurred in an international military meeting in Athens, which
soon became a hot topic. Accordingly, Yannis Mezis, a professor and
an analyst working for the Greek Defense Analysis Institute showed
the Peters map during his presentation, and discussed the over-
reaction of the Turkish public. However, Turkish military officers
participating in the event protested and left the meeting (Hürriyet,
July 7th 2007). Although the professor apologized a few days later
and claimed that he was not propagating the map but discussing
the public response to it, the news itself was agitating enough for
the Turkish audience. The online version of the news published on
Hürriyet’s website received 220 reader responses in a day, each of
which illustrated the nationalist rage against the map (not to
mention the fact that it was a Greek official referring to it).
Here, it is necessary to briefly discuss the newspapers
mentioned above. In contrast to Cumhuriyet, which is the voice of
the state elite and promotes official nationalism,Hürriyet, themost-
widely circulated Turkish newspaper, functions as a powerful
instrument in maintaining ideological hegemony balancing the
views of the bourgeoisie and the military. Although it never resorts
to traditional right-wing nationalist arguments, Hürriyet is a major
medium disseminating subtle messages of “liberal neo-
nationalism”. This discourse “explains national pride, not through
the nation’s unique, authentic characteristics but through its
capacity to harmonize with universal standards”, affirmingglobalization and emphasizing economic prosperity (Bora, 2003:
440e445). Hürriyet has also been a powerful vehicle in construct-
ing the political representation of the Kurdish question in Turkey
(Bayındır, 2007).
If we turn to the responses to the Peters map, an important
aspect was its deployment as a means to attack the moderate
Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) government, which
was labeled by the nationalist parties as a collaborator of US
imperialism. Here, it should be noted that the rise of nationalist
sentiments after 2003 also targeted the JDP, whichwas portrayed by
the nationalist opposition as the collaborator of the US conspiracy to
establish a free Kurdish state. A major reason for this was the fact
that the JDP was the only party receiving votes from the eastern
provinces aside from the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party
indirectly associated with the PKK. Especially late 2006 and early
2007 saw a massive anti-JDP campaign to force the government to
call for early general elections before the presidential elections in
the spring of 2007.1 Hence, the nationalist campaignwidely utilizing
the flag-map logo as an ideological symbol throughout 2006e2007
was also as an action against the JDP.
On the same day with the news regarding the incident in Ath-
ens, the local branch of the oppositional Republican People’s Party
in Erzurum (a city known to be a nationalist base) circulated ads
presenting the Peters map as an illustration of the US proposal for
the “Greater Middle East” (Hürriyet, July 7th 2007). The ad claimed
that Prime Minister Erdogan was the co-chair of the “Greater
Middle East Project”, and the map was the actual proposal of the
project for a future Middle East. Moreover, it was falsely claimed
that the map left Erzurum to Armenia. Although Peters’ map did
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indicating the location of the city would reveal that the city rested
either in Turkey or the imaginary Kurdistan. Nevertheless, it must
have sounded more provocative for the city to be a part of Armenia
for those who designed the ad. The JDP responded by going to court
(Hürriyet, July 13th 2007).
Old ideologies, new technologies: appropriation
as mapmaking
Themost interesting reactions to the Petersmapwere those that
assumed cartographic forms. Alternative maps of the Middle East
rapidly began to circulate especially on the Internet. These
“appropriated maps” were produced digitally through the
reworking of random maps found on the Internet. Fashioned by
ultra-nationalist individuals, appropriated maps always expanded
the territory of Turkey. In their modest versions, Northern Iraq
including Mosul, Kirkuk and Erbil, all of Armenia, as well as Cyprus
and the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea were incorporated into
Turkey. In bolder versions, a larger portion of Iraq together with
a considerable section of Syria including Aleppo were annexed, the
eastern frontier was expanded to include territory from Iran,
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the western border was moved
further to integrate Western Thrace including Salonica. These maps
were easily produced and widely circulated via email lists and
Internet forums (Fig. 7).
The reproduction of power relations through cartographic
means has been discussed in various studies. Among these, there is
a considerable body of work related to forms of resistance; either in
the sense of resistance to cartographic power or cartographies of
resistance (Crampton, 2001: 234e236). While some scholars have
scrutinized the alternative political effects of maps on the part of
the subordinate groups (Helgerson, 1992), others have discussed
the subversive effects of the maps produced by indigenous peoples
with inquiries informed by postcolonial studies (Godlewska &
Smith, 1994; Jacobs, 1996: 132e156; Sparke, 1998). These studies
underlined the counterhegemonic potentials of the production and
circulation of alternative maps which troubled the cartographic
hegemony of (colonial) state power. The appropriated maps that I
discuss here are related to these examples as they generate alter-
native representations to the conventional depiction of a particular
geography. However, they also differ drastically since the appro-
priated maps do not operate counter to either the dominant modes
of cartographic representation or the ideological meanings they
produce. On the contrary, they serve to extend state-sponsoredFig. 7. A map-logo circulating on the World Widnationalism to irredentist and at times racist extremes through
cartography. This is also visible in their rapid institutionalization,
which, as I will discuss below, occurred through the mass repro-
duction of electronically produced appropriated maps in print
forms by various organizations.
The practice of appropriating existing maps and altering their
content is significant in two senses. First of all, such practice
expands the definition of “popular cartography” in terms of agency.
It was earlier mentioned that popular cartography is generally
understood as the maps produced for masses and circulated
through the mass media (Kosonen, 2008: 22). Examples of popular
cartography range from weather maps in newspapers to tourist
maps and road maps. Although popular maps are widely circulated
and reach large numbers of people, there is a clear distinction
between their producers and their users. Yet, in the case of the
appropriated maps, the ordinary receiver of the map becomes
a mapmaker since every producer of a new map is the receiver of
the earlier version of the map s/he reworks. The requirements for
this practice are familiarity with an image-processing software and
access to the Internet. A quick web search for Middle East maps
provides innumerable samples to rework. The user simply fills the
territories to be “annexed” with red, and the map transforms into
a totally new one. The city and country names might require
translation according to the intended audience. The second
significant point is the epistemological status of the appropriated
map, since it abandons its claim to represent the objective truth of
the existing geopolitical situation. The relation of the map to
“reality” e that is, the existing national borders e becomes irrele-
vant; it now represents an irredentist desire to enlarge the national
territory. Nevertheless, these appropriated maps should not be
understood simply as false cartographic representations. They refer
to a historical document,Misak-ıMilli (national oath), that provides
them legitimacy in terms of ideological authority as well as epis-
temological validity.
Misak-ı Milli was originally a resolution passed by the last
Ottoman Parliament on January 28th 1920; that is, between the
ceasefire after World War I and before the signing of the Treaty of
Sevres. The six-item resolution declared the territories which were
unoccupied by the time of the ceasefire in 1918 as the homeland of
Turks and demanded plebiscites for the Arab-inhabited territories
and Western Thrace. Although the resolution did not provide
definite borders, it was the major reference of the nationalists
pursuing the War of Independence in 1919e1922. This historic
document became the reference point for the appropriated maps
produced by Turkish nationalists creating and circulating them. It ise Web as an illustration of “Misak-ı Milli”.
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the claims of the Misak-ı Milli document; yet they construct their
validity with reference to this document. In other words, they do
not claim to represent an existing geopolitical situation but put
forward a political claim supported by the distorted representation
of a historical document.
In addition to the ultra-nationalist websites, even mainstream
forums used by Turkish participants became stages for the
production, circulation and discussion of appropriated maps. For
instance, a number of topics related to themap incidente the Peters
map e were opened within the website wowturkey.com in 2007.
The site, which was originally established for exchanging scenic
pictures of Turkey, had 193,517 registeredusers as of June 15th 2009.
Themain topic addressing the issuewas created on April 25th 2007,
with the heading “How do you like our new map?” and an opening
post including a map similar to Fig. 7. (http://wowturkey.com/
forum/viewtopic.php?t¼40486&start¼0). The topic received 283
messages from 221 different users and it was viewed 34,761 times
by June 2009. Most of the commentators were fond of the map
enlarging Turkish borders while a few protested such expansionist
views provoking hostility towards neighboring nations. Different
users also produced their versions of enlarged Turkey, and inter-
estingly, a number of relatively amateur users requested help in
producing such maps.
The production and dissemination of such expansionist maps on
the Internet soon led to their production in print form as well. In
January 2007, the local branch of the right-wing True Path Party inFig. 8. The “Misak-ı Milli” maBalıkesir published 1000 copies of a map expanding the Turkish-
Iraqi border to the south, invoking the Turkish claims to Northern
Iraq in the 1920s (Hürriyet, January 21st 2007). The party officials
visited houses and workplaces and handed out copies of the map,
and finally requested the Ministry of Education to include the map
within school textbooks. Similarly, in February 2008, Türkiye
Kamu-Sen, the confederation bringing together twelve nationalist
trade unions reproduced a map entitled Misak-ı Milli in order to
distribute to its 400,000 members (Fig. 8). The expanded borders of
Turkey were again filled red and contained the crescent-and-star of
the Turkish flag. A portrait of Kemal Atatürkwas also located within
the crescent, significantly in his military costume invoking the War
of Independence. The map was an appropriated map, which is
evident in the clumsily drawn Turkish-Syrian border. Yet, it was
reproduced and distributed nation-wide. The subtitle below the
map declared: “We will never give up our devotion to Misak-ı
Milli”. The samemapwas very recently sent to the Kurdish deputies
of the Democratic Society Party as an intimidating gesture by the
ultra-nationalist Alperen Ocakları (Radikal, June 11th 2009).
As mentioned above, the original resolution of the Misak-ı Milli
did not include clear borders; moreover, aside from claiming the
disputed territories, ite rathermodestlye requested plebiscites for
them. In the 2000s, however, the actual historical document is
visually reproduced with a significant distortion to its political
claims. The reproduction of the appropriated maps with reference
to Misak-ı Milli not only provides historical support to the ideo-
logical claims they represent, but also convinces the Turkish publicp of Türkiye Kamu-Sen.
B. Batuman / Political Geography 29 (2010) 220e234232that these maps accurately represent the historical document. In
other words, the map, which is supposed to visualize the state-
ments of the text, reverses the relation. With its power to convince
the observer, the map is what shows us the true content of the
national oath; the resolution becomes merely a supplementary
note attached to the map.
It is interesting to note that the circulation of Misak-ı Milli maps
is not limited to the Turkish public. The “Misak-ı Milli” item in the
English version of Wikipedia includes a similar appropriated map
as an illustration of the historical document presented on the web
page. Unsurprisingly, the map was produced by a Turkish user in
February 2007, and it was disputed by other users. The map existed
as of June 15th 2009 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misak-ı_Milli).
The crucial implication of such ideological distortion of histor-
ical facts was obviously related to the Kurdish territory in Northern
Iraq; the appropriated maps served as the proof that Turkey had
(historical) rights to this territory. It was mentioned earlier that the
PKK operations gradually escalated after 2004. Within this context,
columnists in the mainstream media began to discuss the irrele-
vance of existing Turkish-Iraqi border with its incompatibility with
the geographical qualities of the terrain. It was argued that the
mountainous character of the area made it easy for infiltrations
across the border and the security of the border would be much
easier to provide if it wasmoved 30e50 km to the south. A dramatic
incident to fuel these arguments was the PKK attack on a military
post only a few kilometers inside the border, killing 12 soldiers and
wounding 16 others on October 21st 2007. The Armed Forces and
the oppositional parties put pressure on the government to launchFig. 9. Google Earth image showing the Tua cross-border incursion; however, the US authorities denied
approval. It was only in mid-December that the Turkish and the US
governments agreed on an air strike, and Turkish troops initiated
a limited land operation in February. In the meantime, the Turkish
public was furiously discussing an invasion, with the claims that
the Kurdish government in Northern Iraq sheltered the PKK (Özkök,
2007). Within this political climate, the idea of changing the border
sounded quite relevant and found supporters (Akyol, 2007a,
2007b).
The interesting point, here, is the emergence of a new mode of
cartographic representation in reporting the PKK attack in October.
Images retrieved from Google Earth were used by almost all
newspapers to illustrate the event. The foremost quality of this
mode of representation that led the newspapers to utilize it is its
“realistic” depiction owing to the use of satellite images. It is also
important that the availability of “virtual globe” software systems
democratizes the production of cartographic representations
through accessibility and interactivity (Sheppard & Cizek, 2009).
They are open to appropriation and allow users to exploit the data
for further production of visualizations. In the case under discus-
sion, the Turkish media extensively used Google Earth images to
report both the PKK attack and the air strike conducted by the
Turkish military in the following months.
A striking example of such use was Hürriyet’s “photo-analysis”
of the attack published on the newspaper’s website (Demir, 2007).
Composed of 90 images retrieved from Google Earth, the analysis
visually described the area and the geographical conditions which
are advantageous to PKK infiltrations across the border. The imagesrkish-Iraqi border. (Demir, 2007: [1]).
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intersection of the borders between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.
They aimed to prove that the actual borders were incompatible
with the terrain (Fig. 9). The geographical elements; the mountains
facing two different countries on its two sides, valleys cutting
through borders, and the Zap creek disturbing the border with its
irregular basin witnessed the impossibility of securing the border.
The observer is convinced that the terrain has to be conceived with
respect to the hilltops, slopes, plains and depressions, represented
with white, brown, green and yellow in the images. Within this
mingling of colors, the thin yellow line representing the border is
a self-sufficient signifier of its irrelevance. To support this impres-
sion, angular views were also used as landscape images. In addition
to the careful selection of 3D views, they were also reworked with
the insertion of labels and arrows to make the countries identifi-
able. The representation of the region in the form of a continuous
terrain forces the publishers to introduce visual signs as well as
explanatory notes to avoid confusion for the part of the ordinary
viewer. In this respect, the 3D Google Earth views also become
appropriated images conveying a particular message: the terrain
conditions required revision of the frontier, which should bemoved
to the southern plains. To put it differently, the geography required
the Turkish territory to be expanded as witnessed by the indis-
putable authority of cartography.
Conclusion
Nationalism as a political discourse requiring a fundamental
connection to a particular territory has constantly referred to maps
as evidence of the permanent existence of the respective nation. In
the case of modern Turkey, the national map has been a symp-
tomatic signifier of a constant anxiety of territorial loss. Built
around such anxiety, Turkish nationalism has always been sensitive
towards the borders defining the national territory.
In this article, I have shown the production of nationalist
sentiments through the use of maps in Turkey. National maps have
been major tools for constructing a particular image of the nation
with geopolitical implications. During the Cold War, the maps
included in Turkish school textbooks, which were the products of
official cartography, presented a country surrounded by hostile
neighbors on all sides. Yet what was more important than this
particular representation was the surplus effect of these maps,
which I have defined as cartographic awareness. The familiarity
with the national map as a result of its recurrent existence in
textbooks and on classroom walls led to its detachment from the
specialized domain of cartography. The transformation of
the national map into a mundane image has been crucial in the
emergence of map-as-logo, which was invented and put into
circulation to represent a unified nation in the face of the Kurdish
question in the 1990s. In this regard, the cartographic awareness
generated by the national maps in school textbooks represents
a link between official cartography and popular cartography. The
wide-scale and wide-ranging use of the national map-as-logo in
the 1990s illustrates how the map becomes open to new iconog-
raphies via signs and symbols attached to it, once it enters the
domain of popular culture. The superimposition of the logo-map in
particular and the crescent-and-star of the Turkish flag exemplifies
the multiple and even conflicting meanings generated by the same
image.
Finally, I have discussed the emergence of appropriated maps,
which I maintain expands the definition of popular cartography in
terms of cartographic agency. With the help of computer software,
ordinary people have been able to produce their own maps by
appropriating other maps available on the Internet. The emergence
and the rapid spread of appropriated maps are a cartographicresponse to a new phase of the Kurdish question. More importantly,
this was a response to a particular map which was the product of
the imagination of a retired US Army officer. The significance of the
Peters map, which simply redesigned the national borders in the
Middle East, is that it set off a cartographic imaginationwhich went
beyond a mere understanding of the map as the signifier of an
actual geopolitical situation. In other words, it made it possible to
imagine maps which reflected the geopolitical aspirations of ordi-
nary people who, with the help of digital technologies, transform
from map users into mapmakers.
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